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Abstract
Shrestha, Sujit. MS. The University of Memphis. December 2016.
A Security Analysis of Enterprise Mobility Manager (EMM). Major Professor: Dipankar
Dasgupta, Ph. D.
An exponential increase in the use of insecure mobile devices in enterprises raises
a greater risk to enterprises’ data confidentiality. Many enterprises are adopting a reliable
solution known as Enterprise Mobility Manager (EMM). EMM securely manages and
maintains various enrolled mobile devices, enterprises’ applications and content.
However, many researchers have only focused on design and implementation but not on
the security of the solution. Therefore, we performed a rigorous security analysis on one
of the EMM products to find potential security issues. The analysis revealed the existence
of common software vulnerabilities and sensitive information disclosure. With
sophisticated exploit tools, some valid attacks are successfully performed defeating
EMM’s security features such as locate device, wipe data and lock device. To
accommodate our general security recommendations for EMM, we developed a prototype
that benefits EMM admin to determine compatibility and security checks of devices
before enrolling them in the system.
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Introduction
With the emerging trends in the use of mobile devices due to their mobility in
enterprises market, the organizations are having the benefit of productivity and
efficiency. The employees are using either their own or corporate owned (COPE) mobile
devices to access organizations sensitive resources regardless of mobile devices
platforms, mobile operators, and vendors. According to Citrix (2015), employees are
mostly using the enterprise applications and other sensitive information on an insecure
network. There is a high possibility of misuse of the devices, the presence of malware in
the devices and stealing or loss of devices as well. These threats pose potential risks to
the organizations’ data confidentiality leakage. Hence, a reliable and secure solution is
essential for securely managing and maintaining such mobile devices.
Enterprise Mobility Management (EMM) is a solution, which helps to achieve
the above goal (Roundtree, 2012). The purpose of this thesis is to help the enterprises as
well as developers to understand the acceptance of security requirement of such EMM
solutions. In this thesis, we have performed the security analysis of one of the open
source EMMs. We list out potential vulnerabilities and security concerns in the system.
We have recommended some missing components such as enterprise application
analyzers and mobile app verification that EMM developer needs to integrate into the
current system as well.

Problem Statement
To have a full control and secure management of the mobile devices and
enterprises’ applications, a reliable solution such as EMM helps by enforcing the
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companies’ security policies and compliances. However, the challenging issue is how an
EMM developer can guarantee that developed EMM is secure. Until now, various EMM
solutions are provided along with the security features and policies. However, there is not
any proper security analysis of such systems.
In this report, we try to categorize the possible attacks and identify the potential
vulnerabilities. We provide essentials strategies to ensure the security of such system.

Motivation
The Radicati group in their report “Enterprise Mobility Management Market,
2015-2019” states, “Many enterprises are adopting the EMM that can manage all aspects
of mobile security ranging from the device to software, to data and the applications” (The
Radicati Group, 2015). An organization also must be aware of the solutions that
implemented to protect from any cyber security attacks. A rigorous security analysis must
be performed on such popular systems.
If there is not any penetration testing performed before distributing the
applications, the corresponding applications will be highly prone to having any kinds of
vulnerabilities, security loopholes, and other security measures. Many of the researchers
focus on developing the product solution that tries to encompass all devices
(O'shaughnessy, Mol, & Leezenberg, 2007; Laudermilch, Supernor, Boroday, &
Goldschlag, 2012; Z'niga et al., 2013). Some of the researchers working on providing the
security requirements, criteria and threat analysis of the mobile device management
system (Rhee, Jeon, & Won, 2012;Rhee, Won, Jang, Chae, & Park, 2013).
The security analysis of the whole EMM systems is required to detect any
functionality that leads to security loopholes, missing components, and other security
2

threats. The other advantages of security analysis will be the identification of architecture
limitations, procedural gaps, and practical obstacles (Springall et al., 2014). Further, the
analysis detects the vulnerabilities occurred due to logic and protocol implementation
mistakes (Li, He, Akhawe, & Song, 2014). WE can consider all these findings as a
benchmark for determining the security of the system.
Due to above reasons, we need a thorough security analysis of the popular EMM
solution to address their security issues and threats. The outcomes from such security
analysis provide the guidance to both developers as well as consumers of EMM solution.
To ensure whether EMM’s features are secure or not, we seek to answer the
following research questions:
•

RQ1: Are there any well-known vulnerabilities presented in EMM? If any, can
they be generalized?

•

RQ2: Can any EMM security feature be defeated?

•

RQ3: Is there any part of EMM that can cause information leakage?

•

RQ4: Does an EMM perform analysis of uploaded app in the internal app store?

Limitation
In this study, we have chosen only one of open source EMM solutions. We found
that most of the EMM solutions are not open source. For the particular study, we have
selected only Android devices. Because it is easy to debug and play with the Android
device rather than iOS and Windows devices. However, we have tried to cover all
functionality test even only using Android devices.
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Roadmap
In the next section, we present a brief introduction to EMM and its components.
Section “Threats and Attack Surface for EMM” illustrates several of threats and attack
surfaces for EMM along with mobile devices’ common threats and vulnerabilities.
Section “Methodology for Security Analysis” provides an approach that we followed for
the analysis. The next section “Experiments and Results” will list out all the observation
we did and findings as well. Eventually, the last two sections, we summarized the thesis
highlighting future avenues on this line of research.

Enterprise Mobility Manager
Enterprise Mobility Manager (EMM) is a set of people, processes, tools,
technologies and policies encompassed to securely manage and maintain the use of
mobile devices, wireless networks, and other mobile computing services within an
organization (Rouse, 2014). The EMM helps not only to increase the productivity and
reduces the costs but also enhance the security by enforcing various companies’ policies
to the mobile devices (Basole, 2008).
The EMM is composed of three main components as shown in Figure 1:
1. Mobile Device Management (MDM)
2. Mobile Application Management (MAM)
3. Mobile Content Management (MCM)/Mobile Information Management
(MIM)
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Figure 1. The three components of EMM
The Table 1 shows the list of some of the best EMM solution provider with their
website addresses:
Table 1. A list of EMM products
SN
1
2
3
4

5

6
7
8
9

EMM Product
Vmware's
AirWatch
Afaria

Vendor
VMware

URL
http://www.air-watch.com/

SAP

APPTec 360
Cisco Meraki
Systems
Manager
Citrix's
XenMobile
EMM
Filewave MDM

App Tec.
Cisco

http://go.sap.com/product/technology-platform/afariamobile-device-management.html
https://www.apptec360.com/
https://meraki.cisco.com/products/systems-manager

Good Secure
EMM Suites
Landesk
MaaS360 EMM

BlackBerr
y
Landesk
IBM

Citrix

https://www.citrix.com/enterprise-mobilitymanagement/

Filewave

https://www.filewave.com/products/manage/mobiledevice-management
http://global.blackberry.com/en/enterprise/emm/goodsecure-emm-suites.html
http://www.landesk.com/
http://www-03.ibm.com/security/mobile/maas360.html
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Table 1. A list of EMM products
SN
10

EMM Product
MobiControl

Vendor
SOTI

URL
https://www.soti.net/

11

Mobile Device
Manager Plus

Manage
Engine

12

MobileIron

13

SilverBack

MobileIro
n
Matrix42

https://www.manageengine.com/mobile-devicemanagement/?gclid=CLWw5bQldACFU5bhgodsBwEeg
https://www.mobileiron.com/

14

Sophos' Mobile
Control product
WSO2 EMM
product

15

Sophos
WSO2

https://www.matrix42.com/en/products/silverback-bymatrix42/
https://www.sophos.com/en-us/products/mobilecontrol.aspx
http://wso2.com/products/enterprise-mobility-manager/

We have listed all the details such as EMM products’ supportable mobile OS
platform, available features and delivery method in the tables in Appendix section. We
collected the data from online articles and EMM product’s official websites.

EMM Architecture
As discussed in the previous section, an EMM composed of three different
components: a) Mobile Device Management, b) Mobile Application Management and c)
Mobile Content Management. The details about each component are provided in next
sections. The Figure 2 shows a general architecture for EMM.
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Figure 2. A general architecture of EMM (WSO2, n.d.)
A typical EMM must include all three components. An MDM deals mainly on
controlling the mobile devices such as locking, locating the devices and so on. A MAM
has a job to control the access of users to use particular applications. An MCM allows
only approved applications to access the corporate data.

Mobile Device Management
Mobile Device Management (MDM) is an application administrated by an
enterprise admin to monitor, control and make safe the registered mobile devices of
various mobile platforms as well as mobile operators deployed in an insecure network
(Beal, n.d.). Therefore, the MDM operates on the device level.
In spite of additional costs, the enterprises provide the devices to the employees
for data security. Since many users will be working on same devices, there is a high
chance of a reduction in the level of accountability.
Over the past several years, many enterprises are introducing BYOD culture
(Kulkarni et al., 2014) and half of the employees have to bring their own devices even for
official works (Meulen, 2013). The Garba and his colleague highlight that the BYOD
permit users bring their own devices such that employees are familiar and comfortable
7

with their daily used the devices (Garba, Armarego, Murray, & Kenworthy, 2015). Also,
employers do not need to worry about the cost of an extra machine whenever a company
hired a new employee (French, Guo, & Shim, 2014). Though BYOD enhances the
efficiency, productivity, and collaboration, the organization is highly vulnerable to
several mobile devices security threats. A typical MDM system architecture is shown in
Figure 3.

Figure 3. A MDM architecture (Rhee, Won, Jang, Chae, & Park, 2013)

The MDM consists of four main components:
a) MDM Server: MDM server or admin server is responsible for managing the
registered devices’ data, user’s configuration, and policy management.
b) MDM Management console: An admin portal is provided on admin panel where
the admin can login to manage the system.
c) MDM Relay Server: This acts as an interface to relay the communication from
outside entities to the internal components for security issues.
d) MDM Mobile Agent: The MDM mobile agent is a mobile application that is
installed on the user’s devices. The mobile agent helps MDM server on collecting
8

mobile device’s information such as IMEI, battery status, location information
and so on. Also, this application also allows the server to apply policies and
operations received from the admin server. In return, the agent sends the results
back to the server.
The general interactions among the above-listed components are:
a) Enrollment/configuration: This interaction deals with the device registration, user
configuration, and policy compliance.
b) Distribution: Depending upon the mobile devices OS platforms, corresponding
mobile agent applications are distributed through either internal link or public app
store. This mobile agent application must be distributed in the safe path to protect
from re-packaging.
c) Authentication: Periodically, the mobile agent collects and sends the unique
device ID such as IEMI to the server for verification of registered device in the
system even after the installation of the agent.
d) Instruction/operation: The MDM server generates the list of operations such as
locate device, lock device, and wipe data and so on. The EMM pushes all these
operations through cloud messaging to the devices. The enrolled mobile devices
also can request for a list of operations periodically.
e) Control/report: Based on the retrieved list of operations, MDM agent executes a
particular command on the mobile devices. Eventually, it generates and sends the
results back to the MDM server.
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Mobile Application Management
Mobile Application Management (MAM) is a part of EMM and responsible for
distribution as well as the publication of mobile applications and services to the devices
within the enterprises (Patent No. US8862105 B2, 2014). MAM mainly focuses on which
users can download and use which applications. Based on the user’s configuration, the
EMM enforces a policy to the user’s device on accessing the particular internal
applications and services.
The MAM consists of two components: Publisher and App Store. In publisher
console, mobile apps, either internal enterprise apps or external public apps, are uploaded
and published. However, before publishing any app and made to the public within the
enterprise, the app must be reviewed by the reviewer. Once the app is reviewed and
published, the published app can be seen on the enterprise app store. From this app store,
the users having access to the app can install the particular app in their devices. The
enterprise admin can push notification for installing the apps on users’ mobile devices as
well.

Mobile Information Management
Mobile Information or Content Management (MIM/MCM) mainly focuses on
allowing approved applications or devices only to access the enterprise's sensitive data
and resources. The MCM filters the user for accessing content such as email attachments,
SharePoint and network file shares from the mobile devices in a secure and managed way
(Symantec, 2014).
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Threats and Attack Surface for EMM
Since EMM deals with the mobile devices, we need to care about the possible
security issues in such devices. The solution itself is an application that is why we also
need to care about common software vulnerabilities as well as possible attacks.

Mobile Device Threats and Vulnerabilities
According to Symantec’s Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR-2016), there is a
significant increase in some vulnerabilities every year over the past two years as shown in
Error! Reference source not found. (Synantec, 2016).

Figure 4. Shift of mobile vulnerabilities percentage over two years (Data Source: Symantec, 2016)

One of the threats to the mobile devices is jail breaking or rooting of devices. The
rooting or jail breaking allows installing the apps even not authorized from certified App
store. Thus, there is a high chance of installing the malicious app bypassing the integral
security of mobile OS.
Most of the vulnerabilities based on OS platform, libraries, and drivers. In
Android, a component called libStageFright had a vulnerability. The Zimperium zlabs
reported, “All these vulnerabilities collectively named as ‘Google Stagefright Media
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Playback Engine Multiple Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities’ (CVE-2016-2814,
CVE-2015-6602, CVE-2015-4493, and CVE-2015-4480)” (zlabs, 2015). This
vulnerability can exploit by crafted MP3 audio or MP4 video files that lead to arbitrary
code execution.
The other factors that pose the potential risks are a connection of mobile devices
in insecure Wi-Fi, no regular updates in applications as well as OS; no password
protected and so on.

Mobile Device Attacks
With the sophisticated techniques such as Phishing, Scams, many mobile device
users are under ransomware attacks. Variants of mobile malware are being evolved.
According to MacAfee Mobile Threat Report as shown in Error! Reference source not
ound., the number of new mobile malware threats is drastically increasing in which last

quarter 2015 had 72% increase than previous (Snell, 2016).

Number of Mobile Malware Threats

3000000
2500000
2000000
1500000
1000000
500000
0
Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2015

Figure 5. New mobile malware threat statistics ( Data Source: Snell, 2016)
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Various factors lead to mobile device attacks. However, these can be categorized
as malicious software downloads, malicious website visit, insecure network connection
and physical attacks by unauthorized users.

Attacks on EMM features
Regardless of the mobile devices threats and risks, it is also important to do
analysis on the risks that the solution’s features might lead. One of the easy ways of
attacking the application is the way that it works. Most of the attacks can be performed
by abusing the application’s features and functionality (Otrok et al., 2014; Kier et al.,
2015; Hale & Hanson, 2015). These are done to get undesirable outputs. The notification
service such as Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) in an Android can be abused to create a
mobile botnet (Lee et al., 2013).
EMM, as mentioned in above sections, composed of MDM, MAM, and MIM. It
first steps to figure out each functionality in each component. The features or
functionality can be categorized as:
1. Device Management
a. Device Operations such as locate device, lock device
b. Device Monitor – applying policy compliance
c. Notification
2. Device Registration
a. Device Enrollment
b. Device Authentication
c. Device Un-enrollment
3. EMM console

13

a. User management
b. Role Management
c. Policy Management
d. Platform Configuration Management
4. App publisher
a. Review App
b. Publish App
5. App Store
a. Install
b. Enterprise Install
Therefore, these functionalities provide the avenues for performing the attack. Below are
the attacks that would be possible:


IMEI Spoofing: Technically, mobile devices are registered based on the device
IMEI number. It is a 15-digit unique number, which is mapped to mobile device
id, brand, and model. One could fake the IMEI to the genuine device IMEI that is
already registered to EMM. This fake device could have access to organizations
resources.



Location Spoofing: To locate the devices, EMM has a feature, which can send a
command to the mobile agent for location information. The mobile agent will
collect the location based on GPS provider or network provider and send the
geographical location i.e. longitude and latitude in response. If the EMM solution
is displaying these values without verifying the other attributes and the user can
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spoof the location and send incorrect data. There is various location spoofing
application in public app store.


Message payload: The EMM server collects all the operations that needed to be
performed on the mobile devices. It converts such lists into payload with a certain
length. There could be possible of constructing the inputs such that while parsing
such payload could execute undesirable outcomes in devices. Thus, there should
be proper sanitization on the inputs.



Malicious app publication

Methodology for Security Analysis
To address our research questions, we divided our study into two parts: a)
Observational Methodology and b) Experimental Methodology (Springall et al., 2014).
The first part helps us to find an answer to our first research question (RQ1). Our
experimental methodology can answer the rest of our research questions. We selected the
WSO2 EMM solution and implemented in our lab to simulate a real-time environment.
We have created a threat model and attack scenarios as well.

Observational Methodology
Among various EMM products available in the market, we have selected WSO2
EMM product 2.0.1 for performing security analysis. Since it is an open source project,
the source code of EMM are easily accessible. Therefore, there is no need for reverse
engineering the product to understand code structure. Also, it eliminates the effort of
decompiling the executable application. Before proceeding to the analysis, a high-level
understanding of system architecture is very important and must be a top priority task.
15

Therefore, the first step is to collect all necessary design and setup documents to list out
all the EMM's features and components. Next, we performed a static analysis on the
available source codes to determine if there exist some well-known vulnerabilities such
as SQL injection, code injection and so on.
In general, manual code review and automatic static analysis tools can perform
the static analysis. Though the manual inspection of code is not reliable for the
applications having a large number of codes, we traversed each folder so that we can
localize the program file that might be required to fix any security features or
components. It is useful to categorize the programming languages, plug-in and external
libraries being used in developing whole EMM solutions. The knowledge of
programming languages and technologies support to find out specifically related
vulnerabilities.
We used an automated static analysis tool for reviewing security vulnerabilities of
the product. The WSO2 EMM product is written mostly in Java; we need a tool that can
perform checks on an application written in Java programming language. For this
purpose, we used a tool named as Visual Code Grepper (VCG). The VCG lists out the
vulnerabilities based on bad functions, OWASP recommendations and so on (CERN,
2016). The VCG also identify the broken codes (such as the code with label 'TO DO' or
'FIX ME') and complex checks (CERN, 2016). The VCG is one of the automatic security
review tool recommended by CERN.

Experimental Methodology
We have set up a system with EMM solution in our lab to investigate further the
security of EMM. While doing penetration testing on real EMM environment could
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introduce challenges such as affecting real users and devices. Since our setup allowed us
to mimic but realistic attacks without any risks of interfering with real users.
Mock EMM Setup
To replicate the EMM servers, we compiled an available source code WSO2
EMM with version 2.0.1 downloaded from WSO2 Company’s official website (WSO2,
n.d.). We set up the EMM server following instructions based on provided configuration
documents. This set up is necessary to mimic real EMM environment that assists us to
understand as well as capture real-time application flow. Also, to complete a full EMM
environment, we also created a Wi-Fi network via a router connected to the server. Due
to this, smartphones or mobile devices can connect to Wi-Fi network as well as can have
access to EMM server. The list of devices or machines used for lab set up are listed in
Table 2.
Table 2. List of used devices in mock EMM setup
SN

Device/Machine

OS/Vendor

1

Server (AMD Opteron(tm)

Ubuntu server (Linux 4.4.0-36-generic)

Processor 4256 EE)
Table 3. List of used devices in mock EMM setup
SN

Device/Machine

OS/Vendor

2

Wireless Router

2.4 GHz, Linksys

3

Mobile Phone

Android OS, Samsung

4

Tablet

Android OS. HP

5

Emulator

Nexus 5x API23, Android OS
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After a complete implementation of mock EMM server, we captured application
flow by performing some basic operations. The tasks include initial configuration and
profile management on EMM management console, device enrollment, performing basic
security operations from EMM server on the devices. Other tools used for understanding
and capturing the flow are an android debugger; an Android Debug Bridge (ADB) and a
Wireshark (as shown in Table 4). The Figure 6 shows a screenshot of debugged logs in
android debugger.
Table 4. List of analyzer tools
SN
1

Tools
Android Debugger

2

Android Debug Bridge

3

Wireshark

Purpose
A debugging tool that enables us to debug any
Android app running on connected Android
devices or emulator
A command line tool that helps to communicate
with an emulator instance or connected Android
device (ADB, 2016)
A network protocol analyzer that can capture realtime network traffic

Figure 6. Log cat interface of Android debugger showing list of debugger logs
Threat Model
With a detailed understanding of application flow, we attempted to perform the
attacks as sophisticated but realistic attackers. To have a real attack scenario, a threat
model is essential. A threat model is a process that can identify, list and prioritize
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potential threats in the system. The threat model must include threat agents and threat
assets.
Threat Agents. A threat agent is an entity that can manifest a threat. In our model, only an

unauthorized entity and a dishonest insider are considered as threat agents. Although
natural disaster can be threat agent, it is beyond of our study.
The end users mostly have access to devices that means they have access to a
mobile agent, and enterprise applications as well. If such end-users with enough
resources having a high level of understanding of mobile agent, such users can act in a
malicious way when they want to access privileged resources or prevent any security
operations that are performed remotely from the server.
The unauthorized entities include hackers or any attackers that have malicious
objectives to attack the system. These attackers are expertise in hacking the device via
injecting malware into the device. Once getting control over the device, they can gain
access to the EMM server. Since there is also a high possibility of loss or steal of devices,
finder of such devices also can access the system which is not owner or manager of the
system.
Threat Assets. The assets are most valuable entities of an organization. The value of the

assets is determined by a level of protection needed to save a CIA (Confidentiality,
Integrity, and Availability) trade. For our study, the threats assets are categorized based
on section as follows:


Mobile devices
o Stored sensitive information
o Mobile agent

19



EMM management console
o

Enterprise App Publisher

The Figure 7 shows an attack model that helps our study to perform various valid attacks on
EMM.

Figure 7. An attack model

Experiment and Results
RQ1: Category of vulnerabilities found
We input WSO2 EMM product in visual code greeper tool. The selected WSO2
EMM is mostly written in Java programming languages. It is found that WSO2 EMM has
used their framework named as jaggery. It is a server-side JavaScript that accepts certain
data from the client, process the task and sends results back to the client. The code
statistics for WSO2 EMM source code are listed in Table 5 and
Table 6.
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Table 5. A summary of code statistics based on number of lines (LOC)
SN

Types

Number of Lines

1

Lines of code

19791

2

Commented Lines

5717

3

Whitespace

3291

4

Total # of lines of code

29583

Table 6. A summary of code statistics based on programming language used
SN

Programming Language

Percentage of lines of code (19791)

1

Java

70.88

2

Jaggery

4.8

3

Misc. (.xml/.js/.hbs)

24.32

The VCG listed out 260 vulnerabilities from the given source code. After parsing
raw results, we have categorized obtained counts into well-known software
vulnerabilities defined by OWAS. It is found that the vulnerability with the highest
number (165 out of 260) is Missing Function Level Access. The next competitive
vulnerability is Injection with 56 counts. The details for rest of vulnerabilities are shown
in Figure 8. The brief discussion of the definition of listed vulnerabilities is provided in
Appendix E.
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63

# of Vulnerabilities

30
56
165

Missing Function Level Access Control
Injection
Integer Overflow
Sensitive Data Exposure
Denail of Service (DoS)
Total # of vulnerability = 260

Figure 8. A summary of vulnerabilities existed in WSO2 EMM
The Figure 9 shows the number of vulnerabilities based on severity wise. Though
there is few number of critical and high severity, the potential issues count to 161. These
161 potential issues are extracted with reference from OWASP secure coding practice
recommendations. Technically, the cause of these potential issues is due to not making a
final class for public class. The public class without final attribute tag allows an attacker
to extend a class in a malicious manner.
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Figure 9. No. of vulnerability based on severity wise

RQ2: Defeating EMM’s Security Features
As already mentioned in section 2, EMM provides a wide range of security
features. Some of the features are operations that can be performed remotely by the
server on mobile devices. The mobile agent installed in the devices as the mobile
application allows on executing such commands from the server on the device.
To address the research question # 2, we have sorted operations to few numbers.
They are root detection, locate device, wipe data and lock device operations. Hence, we
divided out RQ2 into three sub-research questions as below:


RQ2.1: Can root detection method be defeated?



RQ2.2: Is spoofed device’s location verified?



RQ2.3: Can the operations such as wipe data and lock device be blocked?

RQ2.1 Root Detection
Root detection feature is one of the most crucial features of any EMM solution.
Rooting or jail-breaking the device means a process of providing super user privilege to
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the app and device user indeed. The devices are not rooted because it provides a safe
environment for EMM so that it can manage and monitor mobile devices without any
interference. There is also a rare chance of device being compromised on non-rooted
devices.
However, there is no meaning of existing of EMM, if EMM cannot support if the
device is rooted. A perfect EMM should be able to manage such rooted devices even in
an insecure environment, which would be an ultimate goal of EMM.
To fail the root detection method implemented by EMM, the objective of our first
attack is to root Android device using any sophisticated tool or exploit. The Figure 10
shows an attack scenario. Here, we use an Android App called KingoRoot (KingoRoot,
2016). It exploits the vulnerability of OS and allows the user to have root privilege. We
have successfully installed the mobile agent on such root device. However, there is no
any restriction or root detection.

Figure 10. An attack scenario for defeating root detection
After analyzing the WSO2 EMM’s source code as shown in Figure 11, it is found that
there are few numbers of methods to detect whether given device is rooted or not. Due to
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this limitation, our attack was successful. The methods used by WSO2 EMM root
detection are as follows:


Checks if devices have SU (super user) access



Checks if the application name with super user exists



Checks for the build tags property file for arguments “test-keys.”

Figure 11. A code snippet from root detection program
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RQ2.2 Spoof Location
The location spoof attack is widely popular nowadays. This technique was used
mostly in Pokémon Go application to collect more Pokémon based on distance traveled
(Wehner, 2016). This attack challenges one of the features of EMM: locate the device. To
find an answer to our research question RQ3.2. We performed an attack as shown in
Figure 12:

Figure 12. An attack scenario for spoofing device’s location
To hoax the location, we have used an android app called ‘Fake GPS Location’
that is available in Google Play Store. However, to proceed further, it is required to
enable an ‘Allow mock locations’ option. To do this, we have to go to settings, then
developer options and select ‘Allow mock locations’ checkbox. Now we can choose any
location we want from the app and check it as the current location. The Figure 13 shows a
valid and current location of the mobile device. The screenshot for corresponding settings
and selection of locations are shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15 respectively. This
activity suppresses the location provider with the explicit location of the device. The
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application agent will send this data to the EMM server. In turn, EMM portal will display
the fake location on the map.

Figure 13. A GUI showing mobile device's location

Figure 14. Fake GPS location android app and Allow mock locations setting
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Figure 15. Setting the desired fake location
The Figure 16 shows the fake location after setting the fake location from Fake
GPS application for the same device.

Figure 16. The GUI showing faked location
After localizing the source code, it is found that a Java program named as
GPSTracker.java is responsible for sending the GPS location. The API residing on
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mobile application uses Location Manager Services that allow apps to obtain periodic
updates of the device's geographical location. The location providers, on which agent
application relies, are NETWORK_PROVIDER and GPS_PROVIDER. The Android
developer documentation mentions that the NETWORK_PROVIDER determines
location based on the availability of cell tower and Wi-Fi access points and the
GPS_PROVIDER determines location by using satellites (developer.android.com, 2016).
Eventually, the GPSTracker.java API sends the GPS coordinates- latitude and longitude.
Though it does not bring any security issues, however, giving false information to
the server might be against to the policy enforced by the enterprise. These kinds of cheats
are done not only to hide from the top-level management but also can be used for various
illegal purposes such as accessing the information that is restricted based on the location.
Therefore, tracking the valid location of the device is important.
RQ2.3 Lock Device and Wipe Data
As a result of the application flow’s inspection captured by network traces and
debugger tools, the method name for operations such as lock device and wipe data are
defined as lockDevice() and wipeData() under Operation class. With the help of available
hooking techniques, these methods can be easily hooked and perform any desired
operation rather than expected.
We have used Xposed framework (as shown in Figure 17) that helps to implement
our hooking modules. A typical attack scenario is shown in Figure 18. First, an attacker
installs Xposed framework in the device. Later on, the attacker uploads an exploit as a
module that waits for the particular method’s call. Whenever the method name is called,
the exploit activates and performs other actions preventing the actual objective. For
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example, if attackers want to prevent the MDM agent from locking the device, the
attackers install the exploit that hooks specifically to the method name ‘lock device()’ on
MDM agent package. Whenever the MDM agent tries to perform lock device operation,
it activates the exploit and prevents the operation by sending a null request to part of OS
that locks the device. The code snippet from an exploit that prevents lock device and
wipe data operations is shown in Figure 19.

Figure 17. A Xposed framework installer
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Figure 18. An attack scenario for preventing EMM operation

Figure 19. A snippet of code for preventing lock device and wipe data operation

All of the attacks performing evasive root detection locate device, wipe data and
lock device operations are successful. Hence, it can be summarized as follows:


RQ2.1: Can root detection method be defeated?
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ANS: Yes


RQ2.2: Is spoofed device’s location verified?
ANS: No



RQ2.3: Can the operations such as wipe data and lock device be blocked?
ANS: Yes

Hence, the EMM security features can be defeated.

RQ3: Disclosure of Sensitive Information
All kinds of sensitive information whether it is in transit or rest must be kept
confidential. The disclosure of such sensitive information can be reused for any malicious
purposes.
A WSO2 EMM works on the assumption that device will not be rooted. If the
device is rooted, then WSO2 EMM believes that it can detect any rooting device. On the
root detected case, it populates the warning message displaying ‘You are not allowed to
enroll because your device is rooted’ as shown in Figure 20. However, our research
question RQ2.1 already defeated this root detection method.
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Figure 20. A warning message for rooted device
After successfully rooting the device, we performed forensic on application folder
created by particular WSO2 EMM using ADB shell command. We found an XML file
named as ‘com.mdm.xml’ under folder ‘/data/data/org/wso2.emm.agent/shared_prefs/’.
The file includes all required credentials for authenticating and registering the mobile
device with the server. The Figure 21 is a snapshot of the file showing all information in
plain text.
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Figure 21. An XML file that contains all credentials
Hence, the mobile agent on a device contains the XML file, which helps to leak
sensitive information such as client secret, access token, and refresh token.

RQ4: Insecure Enterprise Application Publisher
The Mobile Application Management (MAM) is one of the components of EMM,
which includes two sections: a) App Store b) APP Publisher. After analyzing the
publisher part, the lifecycle of an application is as shown in Figure 22:
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Figure 22. Life cycle of application in EMM
It seems that the life cycle of the app includes the phase review. However, we can
not find a section that can perform a security analysis of an uploaded application. This
phase can be a loophole for uploading any malicious application from the admin console.
Hence, the internal enterprise app store is not secure.

Discussions
All of the attacks that we performed are successful. Our work proves that socalled EMM’s security features are still not secure. Various limitations on EMM’s
implementation open the backdoor for the attackers to have a successful attack. To have
preventative measures, we provide some security recommendations.

Enhancement of Root Detection Method
A WSO2 EMM has only a few number of root detection methods. This limited
number of methods allows an attacker another possibility of rooting device. However, we
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here provide some general list of root detection techniques, which can cover almost all
ways of rooting the devices.
a) Check default system properties and configuration files
b) Verify installed files and packages
c) Verify if directory permissions are allowed
d) Check for SU binaries and if shell commands are executable
e) Verify runtime processes/services/tasks that has requested for root
permission

Enhancement of Locate Device Method
The drawback of WSO2 EMM on tracking the device location is that the
application does not verify the results provided by two different location providers. The
application must compare if location info sends by network provider and GPS provider
match. Other recommendations are as follows:
a) Detect if an option ‘Allow Mock Location’ is enabled on device’s settings
b) Identify if any installed applications in devices have permission to mock
location
c) Calculate a distance traveled as well as time interval among last two
consecutive locations and verified if the distance traveled is desirable
within given time interval

Anti-Hooking Techniques
Due to various sophisticated hooking tools and techniques, an attacker can easily
prevent the EMM’s operations. Thus, the top priority for EMM to protect from such
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attacks is to implement anti-hooking techniques. The following are the general categories
of verification of hooking techniques or framework in the devices.
a) Check installed packages
a. Search for a Xposed framework or Substrate
b) Check the stack trace for suspicious method calls
c) Check for native methods that shouldn’t be native

A Prototype
Keeping all recommendation listed in above sections, we have built a prototype as
shown in Figure 23 that performs all checks before installing any EMM mobile agent.
The prototype is an Android app that mobile user can install without any technical effort.
This app provides results such as whether the device is rooted or not or check if mock
location option is enabled or not. In other words, each detection algorithms have cover as
much as a general category of detections for each property.
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Figure 23. A prototype for Device Inspector

Conclusions
The Enterprise Mobility Manager (EMM) is an innovative approach to managing
and monitor the BYOD or mobile devices in the enterprises. However, our study revealed
that still there are certain loopholes, which raise the questions against the security of
EMM solution itself.
As a part of this thesis, we have outlined a list of well-known software
vulnerabilities exist in WSO2 EMM. We performed the attacks that were able to defeat
the EMM’s security features hence proving that EMM’s features are still not secure. We
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also provided security recommendations for enhancing current root detection method and
anti-hooking techniques for WSO2 EMM. As part of the proof of concept, we built an
android app as a prototype that inspects all the essential security requirements or checks
on the device. Hence, an EMM solution that wants to enroll the device can perform prechecks with the help of this prototype. Next, we have also detected the part of EMM that
discloses the sensitive information and loophole in enterprise app publisher. Overall, the
EMM developers and consumers can consider this work as a benchmark in pursuance of
evaluating the security of their EMM product.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Table of Mobile OS Platform
Compatibility
We gathered the data in the following tables from each vendor’s official website,
and other sources found on the internet. The data might not be accurate due to rapid
change in EMM product features. We found that the two product’s company are merging
to build one complete product.
The number 1 represents ‘Yes’ i.e. the EMM supports corresponding mobile OS
platform. While the number 0 means ‘No’ i.e. the EMM does not support particular
mobile OS platform. The blank means data that could not be retrieved from online
sources.
Table 7. Mobile OS platform compatibility
SN

Product Name

1
2
3
4

Vmware's AirWatch
Afaria
APPTec 360
Cisco Meraki Systems
Manager
Citrix's XenMobile
EMM
Filewave MDM
Good Secure EMM
Suites
Landesk
MaaS360 EMM
MobiControl
Mobile Device
Manager Plus
MobileIron
SilverBack
Sophos' Mobile
Control product
WSO2 EMM product

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Mobile OS Platform
Android iOS
Window
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

BlackBerry
0
0
0
0

Symbian
1
0
0
0

1

1

1

0

1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1

1

1
1
1

1
1
1

0
1
1

0

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

1

Appendix B: Table of EMM Product Delivery
Method
The data in the following table shows whether particular EMM product is
implementation on premise or provides as cloud-based services. The third column
represents whether the vendor provides EMM for a free trial. For most of the EMM
products, the trial period is 30 days. The number 1 represents ‘Yes’ whereas the number
0 means ‘No. The blank means data that could not be retrieved from online sources.
Table 8. EMM product’s service delivery
SN
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Product Name
Vmware's AirWatch
Afaria
APPTec 360
Cisco Meraki Systems Manager
Citrix's XenMobile EMM
Filewave MDM
Good Secure EMM Suites
Landesk
MaaS360 EMM
MobiControl
Mobile Device Manager Plus
MobileIron
SilverBack
Sophos' Mobile Control product
WSO2 EMM product

Service
On-Site
1
1
1
0
1
1

Cloud Based
1
1
1
1

Free Trial
1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1
1
1
1

1

1

1

1

1

2

Appendix C: Table of EMM Product’s Mobile
Security Features
The data in the following table shows if particular EMM provides mobile security
features or not. The number 1 represents ‘Yes’ whereas the number 0 means ‘No. The
blank means data that could not be retrieved from online sources.
Table 9. EMM products' mobile security features
SN

Product Name

1

Vmware's
AirWatch
Afaria
APPTec 360
Cisco Meraki
Systems
Manager
Citrix's
XenMobile
EMM
Filewave MDM
Good Secure
EMM Suites
Landesk
MaaS360 EMM
MobiControl
Mobile Device
Manager Plus
MobileIron
SilverBack
Sophos' Mobile
Control product
WSO2 EMM
product

2
3
4

5

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Encryption Two Factor
Lock
Authentication Device
1
1
1

Locate
Device
1

Wipe
Data
1

1
1
1

1

1
1

0
1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1
1
1

0

1

1
1

1

1
1
1

1

1

1

0

1

3

1

1

Appendix D: Table of EMM Product’s Policy
Compliance
The data in the following table shows if the particular vendor provides policy
compliances or not. The number 1 represents ‘Yes’ whereas the number 0 means ‘No.
The blank means data that could not be retrieved from online sources.
Table 10. EMM products' policy compliance
SN

Product
Name

Password
Policy

1

Vmware's
AirWatch
Afaria
APPTec 360
Cisco Meraki
Systems
Manager
Citrix's
XenMobile
EMM
Filewave
MDM
Good Secure
EMM Suites
Landesk
MaaS360
EMM
MobiControl
Mobile Device
Manager Plus
MobileIron
SilverBack
Sophos'
Mobile
Control
product
WSO2 EMM
product

1

2
3
4

5

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15

Camera
Enable/
Disable
1

1
1

Bluetooth
Enable/
Disable
1

Root/ jailbroken
detection
1

Wi-FiConfigu
re
1

0

1
0

1
1

0

1

1
1
1

1

1

1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

4

1

1

